Judicial Accountability and the Resignation of Judges

Context

The Inquiry Committee’s report on allegations against former Allahabad and Delhi High Court judge Justice Yashwant Varma is expected to be tabled in Parliament during the Monsoon Session, 2026

Genesis of the Issue

The controversy began after partially burnt currency notes were reportedly recovered from an outhouse at Justice Yashwant Varma’s official residence in March 2025.

1. The Speaker of the Lok Sabha constituted an Inquiry Committee under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 to investigate allegations of misbehaviour.
2. Justice Varma resigned on 9^th April 2026 before the inquiry was completed.
3. The Committee has completed its inquiry, and its report is scheduled to be laid before Parliament during the Monsoon Session, 2026
4. The case has raised important constitutional questions relating to judicial accountability and the resignation of judges.

Constitutional Framework for Judicial Resignation

 

Power to Resign at Will

The Constitution allows certain constitutional functionaries to resign by submitting a written resignation to the prescribed authority. Such resignation becomes effective without requiring formal acceptance.

This power is available to 13 constitutional functionaries, including:

1. President
2. Vice-President
3. Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha
4. Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha
5. Judges of the Supreme Court
6. Judges of the High Courts
7. Governors
8. Speaker and Deputy Speaker of State Legislative Assemblies
9. Chairman and Deputy Chairman of State Legislative Councils
10. Members of the Public Service Commissions

Purpose

1. Protects the independence of constitutional offices, particularly the judiciary.
2. Prevents constitutional functionaries from being compelled to continue in office against their will.

Contrast with Legislators

Unlike judges, the resignation of legislators requires acceptance by the competent authority.

1. Members of Parliament: Resignation is subject to acceptance by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha or the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha under Article 101(3)(b).
2. Members of State Legislatures: Resignation is subject to acceptance by the Speaker or the Chairman under Article 190(3)(b).

Judicial Interpretation

Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra (1978)

A five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that:

1. The resignation of a Supreme Court or High Court judge takes effect automatically (ex proprio vigore), meaning it operates by its own force.
2. Acceptance by the President is not required for the resignation to become effective.

Since 2017, at least 12 High Court judges have resigned. Earlier, Justice Dalveer Bhandari resigned from the Supreme Court in 2012 after being elected to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Key Issues in the Present Case

Administrative Inconsistency

Even after Justice Varma’s resignation became effective on 9 April 2026, his name reportedly continued to appear as a serving judge on:

1. The Allahabad High Court website.
2. The Department of Justice website.

This reflects an administrative inconsistency, as the resignation had already taken legal effect.

Continuation of Inquiry Proceedings

1. The Inquiry Committee examined allegations relating to Justice Varma’s conduct before his resignation.
2. Therefore, it can complete its inquiry and submit its report.
3. The report may be laid before Parliament in accordance with the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.
4. Publication of the findings serves the larger objective of transparency and public accountability.

Effect of Resignation on Removal Proceedings

1. A judge who has resigned no longer holds judicial office.
2. Therefore, the removal motion lapses, as Parliament can remove only a serving judge.
3. Under Section 6 of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, the Inquiry Committee’s report is linked to the removal motion. Once the motion lapses, Parliament cannot discuss the report under the existing legal framework.

Accountability Loophole

The present framework reveals a significant gap in judicial accountability.

1. A judge facing removal proceedings may resign before Parliament considers the removal motion.
2. This prevents completion of the constitutional removal process.
3. Parliamentary scrutiny of the Inquiry Committee’s findings is also curtailed.
4. As a result, judges accused of serious misconduct may avoid the constitutional process of accountability.
5. The case highlights the need to balance judicial independence with effective accountability through constitutional reform.

Way Forward

Legal experts have suggested addressing this gap through a constitutional amendment while preserving judicial independence.

Suggested measures include:

1. Make the resignation of a judge subject to acceptance when removal proceedings are pending.
2. Vest the power to accept such resignation in the Chief Justice of India (CJI) instead of the Executive.
3. Allow Parliament to discuss the Inquiry Committee’s report even if the judge has resigned.
4. Ensure that reforms are introduced through a constitutional amendment rather than executive or judicial interpretation.

 

Conclusion

The Justice Yashwant Varma case has exposed a significant gap in India’s constitutional framework for judicial accountability. Addressing this gap through carefully designed constitutional reforms can strengthen accountability while preserving the independence and credibility of the judiciary.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Q1. Why has the Justice Yashwant Varma case attracted constitutional attention?

Ans: The case has highlighted a gap in the judicial accountability framework, where a judge’s resignation during removal proceedings can prevent Parliament from completing the constitutional process of removal.

Q2. Does the resignation of a High Court judge require the President’s approval?

Ans: No. In Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra (1978), the Supreme Court held that the resignation of a Supreme Court or High Court judge becomes effective automatically (ex proprio vigore) and does not require acceptance by the President.

Q3. What is the accountability loophole highlighted by this case?

Ans: Under the existing framework, a judge facing removal proceedings may resign before Parliament considers the removal motion. This causes the removal process to lapse and limits parliamentary scrutiny of the Inquiry Committee’s findings.

Q4. Can an Inquiry Committee continue its proceedings after a judge resigns?

Ans: Yes. The Inquiry Committee may complete its inquiry and submit its report regarding the judge’s conduct before resignation. However, since the judge no longer holds office, the removal motion lapses, and under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, Parliament cannot proceed with the removal process or discuss the report along with such a motion.

Q5. What reforms have been suggested to address this issue?

Ans: Legal experts have proposed a constitutional amendment to make the resignation of judges subject to acceptance during pending removal proceedings, vest this power in the Chief Justice of India, and allow Parliament to discuss the Inquiry Committee’s report even after resignation.

 

Q6. Why is the power to resign at will considered important?

Ans: It protects the independence of constitutional office holders by allowing them to leave office without requiring approval from the Executive or any other authority, thereby preventing external pressure or coercion.

 

Q7. Why is the Justice Yashwant Varma case significant from a constitutional perspective?

Ans: The case highlights the relationship between judicial independence, judicial accountability, and the constitutional procedure for the removal of judges. It has also revived the debate on whether constitutional reforms are needed to prevent judges from avoiding removal proceedings through resignation.