India-China Border Issue: Origin, Management, and Current Challenges

Background of the India-China Border

1. The India-China border problem goes back to the colonial period and different views after independence.
2. In 1913-14, the Simla Conference was held between British India, Tibet and China and McMahon Line was drawn to mark the boundary in the eastern region, which is today’s Arunachal Pradesh.
3. Tibet, at that time, exercised administrative authority and was competent to enter treaties and the Chinese government also recognized these rights.
4. However, when the final agreement was presented, China refused to sign.
5. Its objections were about Tibet’s status and the division between Inner and Outer Tibet, not about the India-Tibet boundary marked by the McMahon Line.
6. China only established control over Tibet in the 1950s, which shows that when the McMahon Line was negotiated, none of the parties (India, China and Tibet) had raised objections to the boundary.

Why does China not accept the McMahon Line today?

1. After independence, the situation changed.
2. After China’s control over Tibet (1950s), it began rejecting the McMahon Line, arguing that Tibet was never independent and therefore had no right to sign treaties with British India.
3. China also started calling Arunachal Pradesh “Zangnan” or South Tibet, linking it to its sovereignty claims.
4. By keeping the boundary unsettled, China uses this ambiguity as a pressure point against India.

How did the concept of Line of Actual Control (LAC) emerged?

1. Although the McMahon Line defined the boundary in the east, the overall India-China boundary was never fully settled.
2. China, in the 1950s, started to expand its claim lines and in this context the idea of the Line of Actual Control (LAC)
3. The idea of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was first mentioned by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1959, in a letter to PM Jawaharlal Nehru.
4. He described it as the line up to which each side exercised actual control and proposed mutual withdrawals (20 km from McMahon line in the East and from the line up to which each side exercised actual control in the West).
5. India rejected this idea initially because accepting the LAC would have meant accepting Chinese control over areas that India claimed as its own, especially Aksai Chin.
6. However, after the 1962 India-China war, no final boundary settlement was reached. China withdrew from the Eastern Sector, but retained control in the Western Sector.
7. As a result, the LAC came into existence as a de facto (ground-reality) line.

How did India and China manage the LAC afterwards?

1. After the 1962 war, the LAC existed as a ground reality but was never formally agreed upon.
2. For decades, both sides had different perceptions of where the LAC lay, which often led to patrol clashes and tensions.
3. Border tensions increased after Chinese actions at Wangdung (1986-87).
4. Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China (1988) stabilised the ties but also highlighted the need for border management mechanisms.
5. India pragmatically accepted the concept of the LAC in the Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement (BPTA), 1993, signed during V. Narasimha Rao’s visit to China.
6. The agreement mandated respect for the LAC pending final boundary settlement.
7. It was followed by the 1996 Agreement on Military Confidence‑Building Measures (CBMs) which added operational restraints and communication mechanisms.
8. Article 10 of the 1996 agreement called for exchange of maps to develop a common understanding of the LAC.
9. By 2002, maps for the Middle Sector were exchanged. But, China refused to exchange maps for the Western Sector, claiming India had exaggerated its claims.

• The clarification process collapsed by 2004, leaving the LAC ambiguous.

How has India responded to China’s claims on Arunachal Pradesh?

1. India controls Arunachal Pradesh up to the watershed boundary, with only three small pockets under Chinese “adverse possession” (Namka Chu, Sumdorong Chu, and Longju).
2. Initially, China hinted at compromise. Zhou Enlai in 1960 and Deng Xiaoping in 1979-80 offered “package proposals”: concessions in the East for concessions in the West.
3. But by 1985, China reversed its stance, demanding major concessions in the Eastern Sector, especially around Tawang. India rejected this shift.
4. In the 2005 Agreement on Political Parameters, India ensured protection for settled populations in border areas, safeguarding Tawang.
5. China reluctantly accepted, but soon revived its narrative of “Zangnan” (South Tibet).
6. Today, China reiterates its claims more aggressively, renaming places, raising sovereignty rhetoric, and harassing Indian nationals, while India continues to firmly reject these moves and reinforce deterrence.

Why has China become more assertive along the LAC in recent years?

1. Over the past decade, China has become more aggressive through “grey zone operations” – small, incremental moves to change the situation on the ground without triggering outright war.
2. In Eastern Ladakh, disengagement after the 2020 Galwan clash remains incomplete, with restrictions on Indian patrols and grazing.
3. In the Eastern Sector, China now blurs the line between LAC management and sovereignty claims, making the dispute sharper.
4. President Xi Jinping has emphasised that China will not cede “even an inch” of territory.
5. China believes time favours it and prefers sustained pressure over early settlement.

Implications

1. Persistent border tension undermines trust and stability in India-China relations.
2. Ambiguity increases the risk of miscalculation and escalation.
3. China’s claims on Arunachal Pradesh challenge India’s territorial integrity.
4. The LAC issue has become central to India’s security and deterrence strategy.

Challenges and Way Forward

Conclusion

China’s deliberate use of ambiguity along the LAC has turned unresolved borders into a strategic pressure tool. India must combine firm diplomacy, credible deterrence, and sustained engagement to prevent unilateral changes and protect its territorial integrity.